The UN at 75: How America Should Use This Moment to Reflect on its Place in the International Order
November 27, 2020 | Maggie Sparling
On October 24, 2020, the world celebrated the 75th anniversary of the United Nation’s founding. On that day in 1945, representatives of 50 nations signed the UN Charter and committed to a new world order.[i] Since then, the organization has ballooned to include 193 nations.[ii] During the past 75 years, the UN’s role in the global order has evolved. Multilateralism grew in popularity, but, throughout this period, the U.S. remained dominant within the organization and within most of the world’s post-WWII multilateral institutions. America grew accustomed to its place at the head of the table and even came to believe it was entitled to such a seat. However, today, America’s place in the global order is changing, and as its role changes, so will its relation to these international organizations. Transitioning away from the head of the table to a seat among equals will require a show of leadership, grace, and humility. America’s time is not over, but its role is changing. This article analyzes the evolution in America’s relationship to the international order, multilateral institutions, and specifically with regards to the UN. What does that role look like today, and how can the UN’s 75th anniversary provide an opportunity to reflect on America’s historic role and its role in the coming years?
The U.S. emerged from WWII as a superpower. President Franklin Roosevelt recognized his country’s unique position and sought to capitalize on it, manifesting his vision in a series of multilateral institutions meant to protect U.S. interests. The first and the focus of today was the UN. Roosevelt’s approach to the UN was two-pronged. On one hand, there was an idealist goal behind its creation, and he hoped that this global forum could work towards progressive reform across the world while maintaining the peace. However, on the other hand, Roosevelt also approached the new forum with both realism and pragmatism. The UN would become a “forum through which the allied Great Powers could cooperate and, if necessary, force others to do their bidding.”[iii] The first goal materialized in the form of the UN General Assembly and the second through the UN Security Council.
U.S. policymakers realized early on that the UN could serve its interest in the Cold War. In 1948, the U.S. along with its allies and supporters within the UN General Assembly ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document rested heavily on individual rights and the idea that the individual’s interests came before the state.[iv] This was in direct contradiction to the Soviet model of rights where society took precedence over the individual. UDHR laid the foundation for future UN actions and set stage for its favoring of U.S. interests.
One of the earliest concrete examples of these ideas in practice is the UN’s passing of two resolutions in 1950 that backed the U.S. effort in Korea. President Harry Truman had called upon the UN Security Council first to condemn the North Korean attack and then to provide assistance in the U.S. effort to halt the North Korean advance. Both resolutions passed because the Soviets were boycotting the body out of protest for the U.S. refusal to give China’s seat on the Security Council to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). With the ratification of these resolutions, a unified UN military command led by the U.S. arrived in Korea in July 1950.[v]
The Soviets realized their mistake in boycotting the vote. For the next few decades, because both the U.S. and the USSR held veto power on the UN Security Council, the UN played a fairly limited—if not nonexistent—role in some of the world’s most serious crises. In the 1970s, the U.S. recast its attention to the body in hopes of diminishing the impact of the nonalignment movement across recently decolonized countries. U.S. attacks on the UN escalated in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan pulling the U.S. out of several UN agencies and halting the payment of U.S. dues.[vi] Although the relationship between the UN and the U.S. had grown more antagonistic, the U.S. still wielded significant influence over the institution, and UN decisions remained overwhelmingly favorable for the U.S.[vii]
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush called for an international coalition to stop the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. With the Soviet Union clearly a weakened power, the U.S. was ready to step forward and reassert its role in the international arena. Although this moment may seem like a recasting of America’s multilateral vision of the global order, the coalition hid the truth: the U.S. was the dominant power in the partnership and bore the vast majority of the conflict’s weight. U.S. preeminence during this period rested on the fact that it was the only country with the “military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it [chose] to involve itself.”[viii] America had arrived at its unipolar moment. Foreign policy analysts wrote in 1990,
“There is a sharp distinction to be drawn between real and apparent multilateralism. True multilateralism involves a genuine coalition of coequal partners of comparable strength and stature-the World War II Big Three coalition, for example. What we have today is pseudo-multilateralism: a dominant great power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea and still worshiping at the shrine of collective security, recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen.”[ix]
For the past 30 years, the U.S. has grown accustomed to its unchecked status in the world. Yes, there have been conflicts that have exposed some of the flaws in the U.S. vision. But such flaws do not take away from that fact that the U.S. dominated the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. No other country came close to exerting the level of influence that the U.S. did on the world’s economic, political, and military landscape. But this unipolarity was never meant to last forever—it would crumble either due to international pressure or from domestic pressure, namely the American public growing tired of supporting international stability when problems raged at home.
Both of these pressures are emerging today—and have been over the past few years. Calls for ‘America first’ highlight the growing domestic pressures and domestic disdain for America’s role in the international arena. Many are tired of the U.S. supporting a plethora of international initiatives; they believe that other countries are draining U.S. resources, and the U.S. gets nothing in return. But the international pressures have sped up the pace with which America must reckon with its declining relative global power. The unipolar world has collapsed.
The multipolar world is here. No longer does America have its hand in every pie nor does it have the clout to turn every issue in its favor. This change has not been brought about by the collapse of absolute American power but rather its relative decline. The U.S. still has a very strong and powerful economy—but so does China. U.S. values continue to play a defining role—but taken into account with the values advocated by other countries. The U.S. is transitioning from being at the head of every table to simply having a seat at a table among equals. How should the U.S. approach this multipolar world?
It is easiest to begin with how the U.S. should not approach the new global order. First, it should not respond to the collapse of its unipolar moment by retreating. A U.S. retreat from the international arena will widen the already growing vacuum in international leadership. As the U.S. pulls out of various UN agencies and agreements, China is ready to take up the slack and replace America as the dominant influence in such bodies. This is evident in the growing number of UN agencies headed by Chinese representatives.[x] This does little to support U.S. interests. America is better served by still being present, shaping the decisions that come forth from such bodies, and encouraging the participation of other global leaders to balance the interests of countries such as China and Russia. Second, the U.S. should not resort to defending the “spheres of influence” approach. This approach is a version of balance-of-power order but has historically been less stable and negatively impacts U.S. security and prosperity.[xi] Third, the U.S. must resist the urge to become nostalgic for the ‘old days’ where American power was unrivaled. Such nostalgia numbs the much-needed creativity required to re-envision the global order.[xii] The facts on the ground are not going to change—especially not with daydreaming about the past. If America wishes to serve its interests, it needs to learn how to live and function in the multipolar world.
There are a few key ways in which the U.S. can approach the new world order. First, it needs to work for and champion reform of international institutions. Many of the world’s institutions need to be updated to reflect the 21st century rather than 1945. For example, the UN Security Council reflects an outdated worldview. It fails to take into account the increasing role of India and the African continent.[xiii] Veto votes for France and Britain can be replaced with a vote for the European Union as this would better reflect the nature of European politics today—although Brexit may complicate such an effort on Britain’s end. India can gain a seat at the table. Additionally, the U.S. should not shy away from sharing power within the World Bank, the IMF, and other like organizations. This is an extremely effective way to enforce productive cooperation among global leaders. Second, the U.S. and other global leaders should focus on addressing areas where there is much to be gained from multilateral cooperation. Some of the most obvious examples include climate change, fighting antibiotic resistance, and recovering from the global pandemic. These are all challenges that are not confined to a single country’s borders and require international cooperation to be dealt with properly. No one benefits by excluding other nations from the table on such matters. Third, the U.S. should recommit itself to international goals, agencies, and treaties. There is still value in remaining within such partnerships even if they are flawed. It establishes norms of cooperation and lays the groundwork for future progress.
True American leadership will come from showing the world how the U.S. can share power—and how everyone is better off in a world where world leaders treat each other as equals at the bargaining table. Yes, the world will look different without America constantly at the helm. But that is not necessarily a world to fear. Ironically, U.S. interests will be better served by learning how to be a leader among equals rather than retreating from the international arena or holding onto the last vestiges of its unipolar moment by force. As the UN celebrates its 75th anniversary, the U.S. would benefit from using this moment to reflect on its position in the global order and make the necessary changes needed to still be a relevant player in the coming decades.
[i] UN, “History of the UN,” https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html#:~:text=The%20Charter%20was%20signed%20on,representatives%20of%20the%2050%20countries.&text=The%20United%20Nations%20officially%20came,a%20majority%20of%20other%20signatories.
[ii] Dag Hammarskjold Library, “Who are the Current Members of the United Nations?” April 9, 2019, https://ask.un.org/faq/14345#:~:text=There%20are%20currently%20193%20UN,seat%20in%20the%20General%20Assembly.
[iii] Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (Basic Books, 2017), 66.
[iv] Westad, 100.
[v] Westad, 170.
[vi] Phyllis Bennis, “U.S.-UN Relations,” December 1, 1996, https://ips-dc.org/us-un_relations/.
[vii] Edward T. Rowe, “The United States, the United Nations, and the Cold War,” International Organization 25, no. 1 (1971): 64, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2705980?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
[viii] Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 1990, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment.
[ix] Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment.”
[x] Kristine Lee, “The United States Can’t Quit on the UN,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-24/united-states-cant-quit-un.
[xi] Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The Liberal Order is More Than a Myth,” Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-07-31/liberal-order-more-myth.
[xii] Lissner and Rapp-Hooper, “The Liberal Order is More Than a Myth.”
[xiii] Economist, “The UN Renews its Vows in a 75th Birthday General Non-Assembly,” the Economist, September 20, 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2020/09/20/the-un-renews-its-vows-in-a-75th-birthday-general-non-assembly.