The Machiavellian Warning Against Political Idolization
Graphic by Arola Oluwehinmi
Politics is not an isolated function of academic or professional life, but can permeate the everyday life of citizens through popular culture. When political actors successfully market themselves to the public through political imagery and popular platforms it is routine to expect the generation of loyal supporters. Names, faces, and slogans appear on laptop stickers, t-shirts, pins, and water bottles. While it is innocent to express an opinion or involvement in electoral activism, a concern emerges when this practice advances towards idolization; admiring someone in a position of power is routine, but in deifying a politician, one may sacrifice previously held beliefs or obstruct the figurehead from being held accountable for their actions. The current trend of idolizing politicians is therefore a poor practice that can shelter the vices inherent in establishing order in a state (the reality of state-ruling) as suggested by Machiavelli’s The Prince. As will be illustrated through an examination into one of the most popular contemporary presidential administrations, idolizing political actors gives leaders agency to make decisions that are harmful to citizens and against the democratic interests of the greater polity.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND ORIGINS OF MACHIAVELLI’S THE PRINCE
Niccoló Machiavelli was an Italian Renaissance political philosopher and statesman whose posthumous work The Prince (1531) brought him a reputation as an atheist and immoral cynic. Dedicating his book to the Florentine ruler Lorenzo dé Medici, Machiavelli drew heavily on his own political experience to support his exceedingly realistic views on human nature and the techniques of able rules. Contradicting conventional morality, Machiavelli advises wise princes to use violence and cunning to safeguard their states. The Prince explores the careful balance between contrasts, comparing virtue and vice, prowess and fortune, and subjects and rulers.
The motivation behind the piece is still subject to debate. Some scholars of the career opportunist camp assert that Machiavelli’s desperation to return to politics manifested in an attempt to win the favor of dé Medici so as to be rewarded with an advisory position within the Florentine government; others claim that the work is an act of deception, trapping dé Medici by giving advice which would jeopardize his power and hasten his overthrow, allowing for the resurgence of the Florentine republic. Regardless of the rationale, the text can be used as a warning to citizens to see past the manipulation of the state and its political actors.
The Prince posits both a positive and normative argument for its audience: politics does have vice in it, and good rulers should sacrifice virtue in the name of the state. For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Rather, authority and power are essentially coequal: whoever has power has the right to command; but goodness does not ensure power and the good person has no more authority by virtue of being good. Thus, in direct opposition to a moralistic theory of politics, Machiavelli says that the only real concern of the political ruler is the acquisition and maintenance of power.
Whether or not there is an inherent value in practicing immoral qualities for the benefit of the state, however, is negligible in regards to the context of my argument; the appropriate balance between universal moral attributes and effective governance is a subjective delineation still debated by contemporary political theorists. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that the reality politicians in which they act in their own self-interest begets a reevaluation of how citizens have come to immortalize those elected to represent them. Vice is a regrettable necessity in politics regardless of its form: lying for the sake of self-preservation or image, violence on behalf of upholding the state, executive privilege and the omission of transparency, etc.
The work of Machiavelli can therefore be interpreted as a warning to citizens. His notion of public and private morality asserts that in order to rule well, a ruler must be concerned not only with reputation but must be willing to act dishonestly at the right times. Consequently, the citizen should not fall into the trap of “political idolatry” because of the truth of the ignoble political realm. In order to illustrate the warning that The Prince holds, an analysis into Machiavelli’s theory of leadership will be undertaken in a modern context through an examination of the Reagan presidential administration.
THE MODERN TRAP OF “POLITICAL IDOLATRY” IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
In the contemporary realm of American politics, it must be acknowledged that the idolization of political actors is not a problem that occurs on only one side of the party divide. While this examination investigates the realities of the Reagan administration and its success in brandishing strong, perceptive rhetoric and political imagery to win the favor of American citizens, this is only one example of the Machiavellian reality of public leadership. The focus on identity over true policy occurs with liberal figureheads as well as conservative. Reagan, however, is utilized for the purposes of this article because of his status as an icon for his political party and his position as one of the most liked presidents in U.S. history. Although his administration is over 40 years old, the political relevance of his namesake has not diminished. In an age of popularized political figures, Reagan-Bush memorabilia is as common today as a symbol of conservatism as a red MAGA hat. It is in this regard to the fetishism of the Reagan presidency that I introduce my analysis of the modern trap of political idolatry which obscures the truth and disservice of political administrations.
Reagan fared well in escaping being hated by Americans and is remembered even today as a strong leader, yet this fact illustrates the problem of how idolization limits the power of civic accountability. Reagan was far from a perfect leader, often acting immorally in the interest of himself and the state. He can be seen to pursue policy and action which follows the assertions by Machiavelli, yet he escapes any overwhelmingly negative assessments. In fact, in the historical sense, Reagan’s favorability has remained high in comparison to other presidential administrations. Instead, opinion focuses on the popular initiatives by his administration. These facts conclude with concerning implications for how citizens hold their leaders responsible for their performance, harming themselves by ignoring the vices in favor of virtue.
Ronald Reagan came to the presidency in 1981 with a straightforward and well-articulated domestic agenda. His campaign platform promised to cut taxes, curb government expenditures, and reduce the federal deficit. Despite these claims, his two-term presidency was far from the idealized conception most conservatives brandish. Under President Reagan (1981-89), the size of the federal government actually increased: executive-branch civilian employment grew from 2.143 million in 1981 to 2.238 million in 1989. While this is not intrinsically a negative occurrence, it does illustrate a clear deviation from the promises made by Reagan and a disconnection from his surviving image. Additionally, Reagan inherited a federal budget of $599 billion in revenue, $678 billion in spending, and a deficit of approximately $79 billion. He left office, however, with a federal budget of $909 billion in revenue, almost $1.1 trillion in spending, and a deficit of $155 billion.
Not to mention such political failures as the Iran-Contra Affair, Robert Bork’s appointment to the Supreme Court, and the 1983 failure in Lebanon, the Reagan administration did not overwhelmingly act successfully in favor of either of the two American political parties. Nevertheless, many of his failures were shadowed by his triumph of ushering in a new era of governing and establishing a new right wing of the Republican Party. Support for Reagan also grew from his assassination attempt and his role as the “Great Communicator,” often utilizing mass media to generate popular support for his actions. As Reagan left office with a 60 percent approval rating, American citizens were more likely to cite domestic policy issues as rationale behind their judgment of his job performance.
Reagan is a true example of a Machiavellian leader in being concerned with reputation and in his will to act dishonestly at the right times. The administration’s powerful deployment of language and rhetoric fundamentally altered the way Americans conceive their relationship to government. The idolization of Reagan both in the eyes of conservatives and in the sphere of American history not only skewed the reality of his administration, but gave Reagan the agency to make decisions that worked against the interests of citizens. As a consequence, politicians are given a new model of conduct and citizens are unable to hold their representatives accountable in order to safeguard their personal freedoms and liberties.
CONCLUSION
The price of engaging in idolization is substantial. Idolizing politicians obscures the one duty inherent to all citizens of a state: protecting themselves against the Machiavellian abuses of power used to sustain the administration of the state. A core tenet of our democracy—that representatives should serve in the interests of the people—must be restored. Although formal securities against the actions of the sovereign are slowly emerging in the 21st century, promising developments such as Biden’s executive order requiring an enforceable ethics pledge from all executive branch appointees do not protect against citizens’ susceptibility to rhetoric and political imagery. Instead, it is our job to view politicians through a critical lens in order to maintain the balance between voters and political actors. For our own benefit, voters should take a deeper look into the campaign policies politicians argue for and the tangible deliverables that politicians achieve instead of relying on incomplete generalizations based on the discourse generated by the ruling class.