Political Innovation: A Strategy for Changing the American Political Game for the Better

Graphics by Madeline Barber

When the three-point line came to basketball in 1979, the game was changed forever. Matches went from methodical games dominated by large dunkers to rapid-fire contests ruled by ace three-point shooters. That a single rule change caused a complete rethinking of basketball is evidence of a universal truth: change the rules, change the entire game.

It is clearer than ever that the omnipotent game in America, the game of politics, is in need of change, too. Public trust in the federal government is at a sixty-year low, and sixty-five percent of Americans always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. It is understandable to look at those facts and blame politicians for not playing by the rules, but if rules are being broken, there are not many penalties. Politics has been permitted to continue on in its present state largely unimpeded, and both the game and its players are thriving. Campaigns are constant, consultants are endlessly busy, media interest is infinite, and spending on elections is at historic highs. This lack of disincentives for political players to continue acting as they do indicates that the disturbing U.S. political system is not broken at all. It is functioning perfectly in accordance with its rules, and thus only a rules change can entirely alter it. 

The rule change best equipped to bring about desired changes is a package of reforms under the political innovation movement. Two prominent proponents of the movement, Katherine Gehl and Michael Porter, describe political innovation not as a push for viewpoints on individual issues but as a push for a series of systemic rule changes in the governing and electoral processes to repair the systems that decide every issue of consequence. As the analysis in this editorial will show, political innovation is exactly the kind of rule change the political game needs. 

Before exploring reforms in depth, it is necessary to deconstruct politics in its current state to show exactly how the current political rules make this destructive state of affairs inevitable. Gehl and Porter take a business lens to the political game, terming it the “politics industry,” which is a very useful method for observing whether or not politics results in ideal products for consumers. Their analysis shows that the politics industry is a duopoly, a market in which two entrenched companies—in this case, the Democratic and Republican Parties—maintain a monopoly. The competitors are not friendly. They are rivals who would both rather have the monopoly to themselves. However, Gehl and Porter find there is implicit cooperation between them to establish rules that prevent the emergence of a third party. Monopolies’ lack of competition produces inefficiencies in all markets, and the politics industry is no exception. In healthy competition, companies that make underwhelming products are held accountable by consumers, as they will choose to shop with one of the many companies in a competitive market instead. People buy another brand of vehicle if an auto company’s cars continually fall apart, and take their business elsewhere if a restaurant chain is unappetizing. Yet, as Gehl and Porter establish with their research, the major parties that so often fail to satisfy the public are never outcompeted or replaced. Americans are resigned to choose between just two brands. 

Furthermore, the politics industry has no basis in the Constitution, and consists purely of gain-seeking, self-interested, private organizations whose lack of regulation is uniquely shocking. There is the Federal Election Committee, but though it is nominally independent, only representatives from the Democratic or Republican Parties have ever sat on it. This would be equivalent to everyone at the EPA being a representative of ExxonMobil or Chevron, or everyone at the SEC being a representative of JP Morgan or Wells Fargo. Without any oversight, the duopoly has, as Gehl and Porter surmise, established and optimized a collection of rules that benefit themselves at the expense of American politics. They explain that the duopoly clings to power by skewing customer power towards special interests, co-opting the channels used to reach people, controlling industry inputs like campaign managers and candidates with threats of blacklisting for operating outside the major parties, and snuffing out competitors with high natural and contrived barriers to entry. In turn, the duopoly’s hold on the market has resulted in both an incentive to demonize the “other” instead of solving problems and a complete lack of accountability.  

The very structure of the politics industry is to blame, and thus political innovation is the answer. As Gehl and Porter describe, political innovation seeks to restructure elections, change the governing process, and take money out of politics in order to restore healthy competition. Of the many policies proposed along those lines, the three most essential actions are establishing non-partisan primaries, implementing ranked choice voting, and reducing the control political parties have over the legislative process. Though these policies do not represent the entire political innovation reform package, they represent the movement’s foundation. Each is integral in dismantling the dysfunctional politics industry. 

Starting at the beginning of the election process, the partisan primary system presents a wide variety of problems. Many primary elections are closed, meaning they are only open to those registered with the hosting party, which skews customer power towards special interests and highly polarized voters. Since so few elections are contested between the two rival parties, the primary elections that are closed to so many often decide the winner. In fact, a report entitled “The Primary Problem” finds that geographic self-sorting and gerrymandering have resulted in eighty-three percent of congressional districts leaning so far to the right or left that the general election is predetermined. Moreover, it found that eight percent of Americans voted in the partisan primaries that year. This means that just eight percent of Americans elected eighty-three percent of Congress. In any district that was ‘safe’ for one party, voters registered with the minority party had no voice in selecting their representative, and a further 11 million independent voters were prohibited from participating in either major party’s primaries altogether.

The neglect of independents is especially troubling, as they are the fastest-growing group of voters and account for roughly fifty percent of young people, according to NPR. In some sixteen states, though their taxes pay for them, independent voters are completely shut out of crucial primaries, which results in hyper-polarization and more extreme candidates. Moreover, because primary voters tend to be more ideologically polarized than average voters, candidates in safe districts must drift further to the partisan extremes to match polarized primary voters. This perpetual fear of being primaried from within also incentivizes elected officials not to compromise across the aisle. 

Nonpartisan primaries offer the solution to these issues. In a nonpartisan primary, every party’s candidates run on a single ballot in an election open to all voters, and the top finishers move on to the general election. Primaries like these would give voters of the minority party a proportional chance to influence who becomes their representative even in safe districts, and would incorporate independents into the primaries that are often the deciding election. They would also produce more representative and moderate candidates, and would change the incentive for politicians by forcing them to appeal to all the voters living in their jurisdictions rather than just the most loyal members of their parties. Therefore, nonpartisan primaries offer an innovative and urgently needed structural remedy for the politics industry. 

Yet the problems with elections do not stop at the primary. General elections are also deeply flawed, mostly owing to their use of the plurality system in which a fifty-one percent majority is not required to win. Instead, the winner of a plurality contest is the one who has the greatest overall share of votes, which, in races with more than two candidates, can lead to some unpopular victors. In a three-way race, a candidate can win with just thirty-four percent of the vote. This would mean that sixty-six percent of voters would have preferred someone else. Thus, the plurality system undermines the entire concept of majority rule. Another troublesome aspect of the plurality system is the spoiler effect. As Fairvote states, the name comes from the fact that the plurality system disadvantages majority blocs who run more than one candidate because, if the majority splits their vote, it “spoils” the election and hands victory to the minority. Consequently, parties are punished for providing more than a single choice, which runs counter to the foundational idea of choice in American elections. It confines America to contests between the “lesser of two evils,” which is neither productive nor fair. 

Ranked choice voting (RCV) would resolve the spoiler effect and provide majority rule. Rather than voting for only one candidate, FairVote explains, voters in RCV elections “have the option to rank candidates in order of preference: first, second, third, and so forth. Ballots that do not help voters’ top choice count for their next choice”. In other words, if one’s first choice comes in last after the first round of counting, their vote—rather than being wasted as under plurality—shifts to count towards their second choice in the next round of tabulation. The rounds keep going, continuing successive vote redistributions, until a candidate receives a majority of combined first, second, and so-on place votes. In an RCV election, blocs can run as many candidates as they desire with no fear of splitting votes, since their supporters can rank all members of their bloc ahead of others. RCV benefits elections in other ways, too. With the spoiler effect, candidates are incentivized to run negative campaigns against opponents, as they do not need to bring together a majority but must only energize their plurality. However, because RCV candidates must compete for more than just first place votes, it makes demonizing opponents a disadvantage. Insults and attacks would alienate other candidates’ supporters who could provide valuable second and third place votes. Studies confirm this, finding that jurisdictions using RCV have friendlier campaigns.

Another impact of RCV includes increased accountability for officials and the ability to measure feedback on specific policies. As FairVote describes, unorthodox candidates representing small but legitimate viewpoints are currently marginalized in favor of a single-party consensus candidate, which makes elections a referendum on a party’s entire platform. This diminishes the discussion of single issues and makes it impossible for leadership to know which policies are popular and which are not. When voting for the Democrat, for example, there is no way to express which policies are great and which could be improved. Under RCV, candidates in the same party who differ on some issues could both run without spoiling the election. Depending on the results, the party and the public would be able to discern the status of individual issues and adjust. Regarding accountability, RCV enables voters to hold one candidate for a party accountable while still supporting their bloc, at least assuming parties run more than one candidate. It would free Americans from having to vote for one choice they dislike just to oppose another they dislike more. Finally, the fact that RCV produces the most acceptable candidate is a benefit unto itself. If no candidate wins with a majority of first-place votes, a winner is eventually found that appeals to the broadest audience. Ranked choice voting ensures the victor has true majority acceptance. Thus, ranked choice voting is another creative rule change that would help repair the state of the political game. 

Just as victorious candidates continue on to Congress, so too must political innovation—and America’s currently abysmal Congress presents quite a challenge. Gehl and Porter reveal that the number of laws enacted in the 2015-2016 Congress was a minuscule 329 compared to the 1973-1974 Congress’ 772 laws. Moreover, the number of moderates in Congress has decreased from fifty percent of Republicans and eighty percent of Democrats in 1951 to just four percent of Republicans and fourteen percent of Democrats in 2015. Existing electoral problems certainly contribute to this, but Congress’ own rules—which the two party duopoly has co-opted—play a role as well. One example Gehl and Porter cite as proof of this is the Hastert Rule, a commonly accepted tool of the House Speaker that puts party control over the productivity of the legislature. The Hastert Rule says that “the Speaker will not allow a floor vote on a bill unless a majority of the majority party (i.e., the Speaker’s party) supports the bill—even if the majority of the entire House would vote to pass it” (Gehl). Imagine the House’s 435 seats split almost evenly amongst Democrats and Republicans, with the Republicans holding a one seat majority. Even if all 217 Democrats plus 108 Republicans—about seventy-five percent of Congress—support a bill, it could still fail to be brought to a vote if the Republican House Speaker exercises the Hastert rule. The absolute control of the parties over a Congress meant to represent all of America is why seemingly common-sense and consensus bills do not even make it out of committee.

Congressional committees are another place where the duopoly overexerts its power. The parties particularly influence committee chair appointments, despite the fact that party control over committees has caused outbursts in the past. In fact, in the 1910 Cannon Revolt, progressive Republicans turned against their own speaker in protest of the “czar-like” power he and the party exercised over Congress. Prior to the revolt, the Speaker had the powers to make committee appointments, choose whether or not to recognize bills for votes, and to chair and control the crucial House Rules Committee; after the revolt, however, the Speaker’s power was greatly reduced, especially with committees and committee chairs. 

Yet the era of reduced partisanship in Congress came to an end under Republican Speaker Newt Gingrich. He is widely credited with reintroducing the nihilistic partisanship quintessential to Congress today, and his reign was chiefly concerned with centralizing power in party leadership. He took back the power of the Speaker to appoint key committee chairs, including the Rules Committee Chair, which returned massive control to the Speaker and stoked the partisan flames that are crippling Congress. Consequently, legislators today must adhere strictly to the party line if they want any chance of bringing a bill to the floor or receiving a good committee assignment, which further disincentivizes compromise.

Thus, the reduction of the parties’ control over Congress is another crucial aspect of political innovation. Nonetheless, it may be a little difficult to achieve, as Congressional rules are determined by legislators who have already succeeded under the current system. Still, there are ways to subvert the duopoly’s lock on Congress. As Gehl and Porter propose, one route could be establishing an independent “Legislative Reform Commission” made up of people unattached to the parties or the government, which would craft a set of legislative rules to be recommended to Congress. Hope also exists in the fulcrum strategy, which is a highly leveraged way to break current political gridlock. By using politically innovative elections, the fulcrum strategy aims to elect a contingent of lawmakers dedicated to the cause that can begin making change from within Congress. Although the fulcrum strategy applies to all political innovation policies, it seems especially salient here since House and Senate rule changes can only be executed by congressmen and senators.

There are more reasons for hope, too. For one, political innovators have the significant advantage of elections being directed almost exclusively at the state and local levels. This does make seeking political innovation more complicated than if it could be unilaterally mandated at the federal level, but as advocates correctly point out, there is an upside to starting smaller and building upwards. It would only take five politically innovative states to elect a fulcrum of ten senators consistent with the fulcrum theory, for example, which is greatly more feasible than achieving unilateral change on the national level. Moreover, while federal action would require convincing senators and congresspeople, working state-by-state provides the opportunity for activists to push for political innovation more directly. As Gehl and Porter mention, voters at the state level often have forms of direct democracy at their disposal like ballot initiatives or referendums in twenty-seven states, not to mention the option of legal challenges.

Finally, there is reason for optimism in existing precedent. After all, in the words of poet Victor Hugo, “there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come.” Four states—Alaska, California, Louisiana, and Washington—are already remarkably close to solving the primary problem, as they have replaced partisan primaries with more open systems that have proven to increase electoral competition. Furthermore, as of November 2023, FairVote recognizes fifty American jurisdictions covering roughly 13 million voters that utilize ranked choice voting, including two states, three counties, and forty-five cities. Moreover, six additional states already use RCV for military and overseas ballots. Thus, political innovation has already begun. 

Though it is certainly disheartening to see the rules of the political game stacked against the average citizen as they are, there is hope and comfort in the fact that it is only rules that are the source of so many problems. Rather than facing a failing and broken system or evil and conniving politicians, America is merely dealing with some statutes and their resulting incentives. The rules and the systems that inhibit healthy competition in politics are entrenched, but they are identifiable and, as this editorial shows, changeable. Therefore, political innovation—specifically nonpartisan primaries, ranked choice voting, and the removal of the parties’ grip on the legislative process—is the solution for restructuring politics. It is time to change the rules of politics, so that we can truly change the entire game.