China and Taiwan: Preparing for the Next Major Threat

Graphic by Maggie Sparling

In the weeks since Russia invaded Ukraine, the world has watched a democratic country struggling against the aggression of a powerful autocracy. Even as the United States helps the Ukrainian people fight for their freedom and for global democracy, it must also prepare for the next major threat: a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Just one hundred miles off the coast of mainland China, the country of Taiwan is struggling to maintain its independence. Once a part of China, Taiwan is now a flourishing democracy with free and fair elections and a sense of national pride. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintains that Taiwan is an integral part of China, not an independent country, and must be reabsorbed. With so much uncertainty around Taiwan—and international relations in general—it is worth asking a few questions. How far will China go to achieve its goal of reunification? What options does the United States have to protect the Taiwanese people from Chinese aggression? And finally, what should the United States do today so that it can defend Taiwan tomorrow?

PART I: ONE CHINA

Just nine days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China announced that it was committed to “resolving the Taiwan question in the new era,” giving new urgency to a long-held goal of reunification. Chinese foreign policy is guided by the One China Principle, which maintains there is only one China, of which Taiwan is an inalienable part. This policy originated with the genesis of the PRC, when the U.S.-backed nationalist government fled to Taiwan, robbing the PRC of what it considered its legal territory as the ruling government of China. This slight has not been forgotten, and at every opportunity, China renews its commitment to reunifying Taiwan with China. Taiwan is a constant feature in the PRC’s annual work report and has been a clear focus of the PRC since its establishment in 1949. China also uses coercive diplomacy to press other nations to recognize Taiwan as a part of China, leaving only thirteen countries that fully recognize Taiwan. When Lithuania joined that list, China cut off all trade and pulled out its diplomats.

In the past few years, China has been especially clear on its intentions toward Taiwan. President Xi Jinping recently declared that reunification of Taiwan “must be fulfilled.” The Chinese Defense Minister, Wei Fenghe told the U.S. Defense Secretary in late April that “Taiwan is a part of China and no one can change that.” China has also increased its military actions, making 950 military flights into Taiwanese airspace in 2021. While it is clear from PRC rhetoric what China wants from Taiwan, there is no way to know what China plans to do to achieve those goals. The U.S. Department of Defense reported as recently as 2021 that China “appears willing to defer the use of military force" against Taiwan, so long as it believes that invading Taiwan is more costly than negotiating reunification with Taiwanese leaders. However, it is clear that Taiwan is unwilling to go along with China’s ambitions. Its current president, Tsai Ing-wen comes from an explicitly nationalist party, and unification with China is overwhelmingly unpopular in Taiwan. It is hard to imagine a world in which Taiwan willingly unifies with China without a fight of some kind. This leaves the threat of a major war in Asia, and the question of what the United States is prepared to do about it.

PART II: DIPLOMACY

Despite the uncertainty around China’s intentions, it is important to consider the options that the United States has to respond to potential Chinese aggression. The options fall into three broad categories: diplomacy, sanctions, and military action.

The first option is diplomacy. Under its One China Policy, the United States only recognizes one China (the PRC) and recognizes the importance of the Taiwan issue to both parties. However, U.S. relations with Taiwan—while unofficial—are still vibrant. In the dispute over the future of Taiwan, it may help to have a superpower like the United States on the side of the small democracy. Seeking a diplomatic resolution before or even after a conflict is a valuable option, though not a perfect option. Any negotiations with China would require sacrifices to Taiwan’s autonomy; and while sacrificing some sovereignty may save lives, it would also impede the freedom that the Taiwanese people are seeking to defend. Involving the United States in this type of diplomacy may also backfire, turning the Taiwan issue into a game of great power politics and bringing the world closer to the war that diplomacy aims to prevent.

PART III: SANCTIONS REGIME

While it is far too soon to draw any conclusions from the ongoing war in Ukraine, the unified response to the Russian invasion points to another crucial option for the United States: sanctions. The efficacy of sanctions is highly debated, but sanctions are most effective against autocracies when they are targeted and multilateral, as they have been against Russia. Sanctions can also be applied in advance of any Chinese military action as a less escalatory form of deterrence. 

However, the United States is wildly unprepared to create and enforce a sanctions regime against China. The Biden administration made remarkable progress in leading a united front against Russia, but sanctions against China are simply not the same. Sanctioning China would be more damaging to the American economy and to that of its allies, making a multilateral response nearly impossible. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and many countries—like the United States—rely on its manufacturing strength. In 2020, China exported USD $438 billion in goods to the United States, mostly in clothing, computers, and other electronics. By contrast, Russia only exported USD $11.9 billion in goods to the United States. The United States is not the only country with deep economic ties to China. To date, 146 countries have signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s major economic initiative to reshape the global economy around its own. These countries, many of which benefit from conditionality-free Chinese investment in infrastructure or are tied to China by debt, would be loath to join a U.S. sanctions regime and risk losing this funding. Even within the United States and its traditional allies, sanctions-exhaustion would kick in quickly without access to basic items that citizens have come to expect. With a better understanding of the circumstances, it is clear that the United States is not prepared to enact a multilateral sanctions regime against China.

PART IV: MILITARY DEFENSE OF TAIWAN

The final broad option is the use of military force—or the threat to use military force—to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression. Currently, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is that of strategic ambiguity. The United States does not have a mutual defense agreement toward Taiwan, but it also has not explicitly ruled out coming to Taiwan’s aid. The deterrent value of this policy is twofold: on one hand, the ambiguous threat of American interference has stayed China’s hand over the years. On the other, the lack of an explicit promise to defend Taiwan gives Taiwanese leaders good reason to avoid provoking China into a conflict.

Strategic ambiguity does leave the door open for an American military defense of Taiwan. The United States could practice deterrence by openly vowing to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, or (if deterrence fails) it could actually send troops to Taiwan’s defense. However, like in the case of sanctions, the United States is not prepared to defend Taiwan from the Chinese military. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest standing army in the world and is increasingly capable of fulfilling the PRC’s global ambitions. The PLA has grown in size in the past decade, and China incorporates new technologies into its military infrastructure. Combating the modernized Chinese military so close to the Chinese mainland is a major challenge. In order to prevail, the United States would have to commit significant resources to its military capabilities in Asia, which is both costly and risks escalation with China.

Even setting aside the logistics, the political feasibility of such an intervention is in doubt. While Americans support aiding allies key to U.S. security interests, 65% of Americans also believe that the United States should only attack if it is attacked first. Concerns about American casualties in drawn-out wars are a significant hurdle to a U.S. military response to China. China is also a nuclear power, and while the United States holds the nuclear advantage, risking nuclear war for another state is unlikely to be popular with the American public. 

PART V: PREPARING THE FRONTLINES

China has made its intentions clear: it believes that Taiwan is part of China, and it is prepared to act on that principle. Perhaps the unified response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine will stay China’s hand in the near future, but it is unlikely to do so for long. China has no doubt observed both the West’s refusal to send troops to Ukraine, and its resistance to sanctioning the energy sector, the only part of Russia’s economy that would actually hurt Vladimir Putin. Given how unprepared the United States is for this major threat, the United States must begin to prepare now for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

If the United States wants to resolve the China-Taiwan conflict with diplomacy, it must begin building that foundation now. Any communications between the United States and China, whether that be through Secretary of State Blinken or the president himself, should make support for Taiwanese sovereignty clear, leaving behind a key element of strategic ambiguity. U.S. diplomacy with China should also include key allies like Great Britain, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The United States cannot, and should not, embark on this process alone.

To prepare the United States to enact effective sanctions against China, the U.S. government should invest in self-sufficiency and build relationships with alternate suppliers. For example, the United States imports most of its computers from China, at a valuation of USD $48.9 billion, and only exports a total of USD $16.6 billion in computers. Sanctioning the powerful Chinese technology sector now would be incredibly damaging to the U.S. economy. The United States must therefore invest in infrastructure for domestic technology production, including grants and subsidies for American technology companies and funding for research and development. This process should extend to allies from which the United States already imports large quantities of computers, like Vietnam, Mexico, and Taiwan. This is a long process, but it is critical to the success of any sanctions against China.

Military action in Taiwan should be a last resort option, used only if all other avenues are exhausted. It is, however, prudent to prepare for this outcome. The United States should publicly reaffirm its alliances in East Asia, especially with South Korea and Japan where the U.S. military has established bases. The U.S. military should also focus its intelligence and planning efforts on this critical region after decades of hyper-focusing on the Middle East.

None of these preparations assure that the United States will be ready to respond in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Nor is it clear just what the future holds for this small island country. What is clear is that China has its sights set on reunification, and that the United States has a long road ahead if it hopes to even have the option of defending Taiwan.