The Aussie Submarine(s): AUKUS, International Security, and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific
Graphic by Arola Oluwehinmi
A glance over news headlines in early September offers some combination of the words “submarine,” “United States,” and Australia. A double-take would offer some news headlines about angry Frenchmen. Like most front-page stories, the controversy and discussion of the newly formed Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership, or AUKUS for short, has been washed away by other news stories in mainstream outlets. Nonetheless, the AUKUS deal remains a pertinent policy issue, warranting a deeper analysis of its role in American foreign policy objectives and America’s role on the world stage.
The part of the AUKUS deal garnering the most attention is its plan to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to the Australian Navy via sharing nuclear technology. However, details over the timeframe and the specific technology shared between the three partners are still unclear. AUKUS also includes other issues relevant to the Indo-Pacific region and competition with China, including provisions for collaboration over quantum computing technology. When the deal was announced, it was met with pushback from the French government, which had already negotiated a $90 billion deal in 2016 to provide twelve diesel-electric submarines to Australia. The new AUKUS deal completely reversed this agreement and drew outrage from the French Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who called it a “stab in the back.”
It is clear to international relations observers that AUKUS is part of an American strategy to increase its long-term presence in the Pacific vis-à-vis China and indicates a re-centering of geopolitical interest away from the Middle East. The signaling of American commitment to the region could alleviate Japanese and Korean doubts over American security commitments and strengthen the First Island Chain, a range of islands that have hemmed in China’s naval aspirations. Furthermore, the Australian government’s decision to join the United States represents a firm commitment to take Washington’s side in the Pacific, an area increasingly demarcated by American and Chinese spheres of influence.
AUKUS also marks a shift in the United States’ nuclear policy. Since its development in the 1950s, the United States has shared its nuclear-propulsion technology with only one country: the United Kingdom. While this policy change recognizes the necessity of partnerships to counter China’s growing influence, AUKUS does not create new relationships but deepens existing ties between Washington and Canberra. The United States and Australia already share intelligence between each other and three other partners under the Five-Eyes Agreement. The United States and Australia are also members of the Quad, along with India and Japan, a partnership between maritime democracies in the Pacific on issues from security to infrastructure development. The AUKUS deal represents what U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has called “integrated deterrence,” which involves “integrated networks among our capabilities, our operations, and our allies.”
Despite the fanfare from the partner nations over the AUKUS deal, it is not without its challenges. The consequences of the AUKUS deal include pressing issues and implications of American foreign policy that require a measured response by Washington.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NORMS
One of the significant issues with the AUKUS deal is its potential impact on international non-proliferation norms, especially over the transfer of nuclear technology and the inspection of nuclear material. While there is currently no agreed-upon policy for how Australia will obtain the necessary nuclear fuel for its new submarine fleet, it will either be delivered via another country or produced domestically. There are questions over whether the sale of nuclear fuel to Australia by one of the AUKUS partners would violate international norms.
However, the more daunting issue concerns the monitoring of nuclear fuel once Australia obtains it. States can develop nuclear-powered ships under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and a country’s stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), which powers nuclear submarines, are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Despite this, there is a loophole within the NPT that allows a state to essentially prevent the oversight of HEU if inspection by the IAEA would compromise proprietary technology or risk military secrets. Australia is one of the world’s largest raw uranium producers, and if it chooses to enrich uranium, it could become the first NPT-signatory to use this loophole. There is little concern over whether Canberra would abuse this loophole for weapons development. Still, experts worry that it could set a precedent for other countries to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of nuclear-propulsion technology.
That precedent sets up a potential scenario where a nation like Iran could use naval technology to hide their already well-known nuclear technology development. Regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, which has long considered a nuclear arsenal of their own, or Turkey, could abuse this loophole too, risking an arms race. The same situation applies to any rogue state that wants its own bomb. If Australia produces HEU with little oversight from the IAEA, it will significantly harm international non-proliferation norms. As the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace explains, there are no direct consequences for violation of IAEA regulations other than a review by the UN Security Council. Successful non-proliferation regimes rely on consensus by the international community to observe and comply with rules.
FUTURE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
While the French were completely isolated in the negotiations over the AUKUS agreement, causing the Foreign Minister to call the deal “brutal, unilateral, and unpredictable,” the entirety of the European Union was also kept in the dark about the new agreement. A few days before its announcement of the deal, the EU published a whitepaper on strategy in the Indo-Pacific theater, highlighting their desire to be more involved in the region’s affairs. The paper’s content reflects concerns shared with the United States over geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and is likely the result of pressure from Washington over such issues. Some argue that the exclusion of the EU from any agreement represents a feeling within Washington that transatlantic cooperation is no longer a necessary component of their long-term strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This position could also complicate cooperation with Brussels on several other issues.
Notwithstanding the evidence, these fears are overblown. At its worst, the fallout of the AUKUS announcement represents a diplomatic failure and a growing distrust between Europe and its traditional allies. Worth noting, though, is that the French sought to reestablish diplomatic normalcy with Washington before London or Canberra, issuing a joint statement reaffirming “the strategic importance of French and European engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.” The United States also recognized the importance of European security as a complement to NATO, implicitly reaffirming its commitment to NATO and its role in transatlantic and global security.
At its best, the fallout AUKUS deal represents an opportunity for the United States to deepen its ties with the EU and include them in the “integrated deterrence” that AUKUS seeks to foster. Recently, the Chinese refused a port-of-call request at Shanghai from the German warship Bayern while it was on its tour of Asia, indicating that the Chinese do not view the EU as a potential strategic partner. The United States ought to capitalize on Chinese dismissiveness to work with the EU to develop a strategic partnership that counters China’s rise.
ECONOMIC VERSUS MILITARY STRATEGY
While most of the discussion from academic and news outlets on AUKUS has focused on the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation or U.S.-EU cooperation, they often leave out the most significant challenge of the AUKUS deal: what it means for the United States’ long-term strategy in the Pacific. The decision to focus on submarine technology indicates that Washington wants to counter China with military strength, in contrast with previous attempts to build an economic alliance in Asia.
Throughout the Obama administration, Washington had lobbied for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was signed in 2016 but killed by the Trump administration in 2017. In response, the remaining signatories signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the Biden administration has refused to join unless parts of the agreement are amended to suit Washington’s interest. The Chinese, however, have applied to formally join the CPTPP after talks with Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand, showing China’s desire to further integrate the region economically with itself. This announcement came at the same time as the AUKUS agreement. Should China be accepted in the CPTPP, its increased economic dominance in Asia could pose a risk to the core goals of the AUKUS deal. In the long term, leveraging the advantages of AUKUS members’ military technology may be futile as China gains control through sheer economic force.
LOOKING AHEAD: SOLVING THE CHALLENGES OF AUKUS
The AUKUS deal is part of the United States’ grand strategy to contain and counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The agreement is not without its challenges, but these challenges represent an opportunity for the United States to regain a role of global leadership, a position that the United States retreated from under the Trump administration.
Washington will need to continue leading a non-proliferation regime, as it has for many years concerning Iran, to prevent the potential for nuclear proliferation if loopholes within the NPT become abused. Meanwhile, the United States should also call for better enforcement of IAEA regulations so that potential proliferators cannot use the veneer of nuclear propulsion to develop a stockpile of nuclear weapons.
The United States must also reduce the potential fallout of the AUKUS deal on its European partnerships. While the United States will likely never abandon Europe and the Atlantic, the United States cannot afford to ignore the region while it focuses on the Pacific. As a solution, the United States must reinvigorate NATO as a larger deterrence strategy against China. An integrated security response from military allies in the Pacific and Atlantic would offer more significant challenges to China’s dreams of establishing a true blue-water navy.
Lastly, Washington needs to consider the viability of a military-centric strategy in the long term. Despite the size of the People’s Liberation Army, economic policy is still China’s most potent weapon. No matter how many guns the United States puts in the Pacific, many states’ real driver of decision-making is money. An aggressive policy of economic integration could give the Chinese better leverage in Asia and compensate for military weaknesses.
This challenge for the United States also coincides with the issue of non-proliferation. Suppose Washington cannot effectively lead on non-proliferation norms. In that case, more consideration is needed over the marginal cost of adding more nuclear risk into the world versus the benefit of Australia having a nuclear submarine fleet. While more subs might increase defenses in the First Island Chain and strengthen cooperation against China, it does not respond effectively to China’s move to establish a blue water navy through plans like the Belt and Road Initiative. If the United States cannot continue to contain China to its near seas through a change in trade policy or an alternative strategy, adding more nuclear submarines to the region might increase the move towards a naval arms race and increase the risk of an incident going hot.
Considering that the AUKUS deal is here to stay, the United States must craft effective responses to all these challenges. Failure to act would undermine the core missions of AUKUS while making the world potentially more dangerous. Likewise, measured answers to these issues could leave the United States a much stronger position in Asia and the world.